Portland State University

PDXScholar
Special Collections: Oregon Public Speakers

Special Collections and University Archives

4-12-1969

"The Role of Youth in World Affairs Today"
Covey T. Oliver

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/orspeakers
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Oliver, Covey T., ""The Role of Youth in World Affairs Today"" (1969). Special Collections: Oregon Public
Speakers. 77.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/orspeakers/77

This Article is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Special Collections:
Oregon Public Speakers by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this
document more accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

Covey T. Oliver
“The Role of Youth in World Affairs Today”
April 12, 1969
Portland State University
PSU Library Special Collections and University Archives
Oregon Public Speakers Collection
http://archives.pdx.edu/ds/psu/11296
Transcribed by Nia Mayes, February 10, 2021
Audited by Carolee Harrison, February 2021

PSU Library Special Collections and University Archives presents these recordings as part of the historical
record. They reflect the recollections and opinions of the individual speakers and are not intended to be
representative of the views of Portland State University. They may contain language, ideas, or
stereotypes that are offensive to others.

HOST: “And they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks.
Nations shall not lift up sword against nation. Neither shall they learn war anymore.” The
honorable Covey T. Oliver, our speaker this afternoon, is presently the U.S. Director of the
World Bank and its affiliates, the International Finance Corporation and the International
Development Association. He is presently also Professor of Law at University of Pennsylvania,
former Professor of Law at the University of California at Berkeley, and former Associate
Professor of Law at the University of Texas.
Dr. Oliver has five children: three in college and two in high school. As his whole family in 1963,
they were fortunate enough to live in São Paulo, Brazil, where he was granted a Fulbright-Hays
teaching fellowship at the Law School of The University of São Paulo. This is a great distinction
to Dr. Oliver, as at this time he was the only high U.S. government official to have bequested to
him a Fulbright-Hays teaching fellowship.
Dr. Oliver will speak on the role of student opinion and the role of the student in world affairs.
And I’m sure you will realize his knowledge and his awareness into making this world, to
challenging us as students, us as future foreign service personnel, future college professors,
future professionals, into leading this world so that we shall put down our swords, and lift up
plowshares and pruning hooks. The honorable Dr. Oliver. [applause]

COVEY T. OLIVER: Mr. Irving; President Wolfe; distinguished invitees to the installation of the
President; and, as Franklin Roosevelt would have said, “My fellow students.” I am delighted to
be here, especially to have a little part in the prologue to the installation of a dear friend and
very able man as President of your institution of higher learning. I’m very happy that you have
him; I think you are very fortunate. And I wish him and you the most productive and intelligent
and friendly of associations during the years that he and his wonderful wife serve you here.
I am a university man. When I went to São Paulo, I went as a professor of law from the
University of Pennsylvania, on leave from that institution. I thought I’d make that point clear
because those who work for the Department of State, as Dr. Wolfe has and as I have, don’t
have time, regrettably perhaps, to go on sabbaticals. I became accustomed to working a sevenday week, and that’s one reason why I can stay ahead of my colleagues to some extent in the
World Bank, now that I am trying to do both things for one semester: teach and discharge my
duties in Washington. I got into the habit of working on the weekends, as Mr. Wolfe did, and I
can still do it for a little while longer.
But at São Paulo, I was just there as a professor; the point that gives me some satisfaction is
that later, the year after I was at São Paulo—developing mild claustrophobia while riding on the
crowded buses—no automobile, of course, because of no diplomatic privilege and the like. The
following year, to my considerable surprise, after I taught just one year again at the university, I
was asked to be U.S. ambassador to Colombia, South America, the fourth-largest country in
South America. And I found the contrast very much in favor of my life in São Paulo, in the sense
that as an official of the United States, or, I suppose this would be true for any other official, a
high official of government, I was not in a position really to live with the ordinary people of
Colombia as much as I would have wanted to; as I had, with my family, to live with the people
of Brazil in São Paulo. And of course, I think that I wanted to clarify that point, but at the same
time to make a preliminary point to you: that you, in your student years and in your youthful
years especially, have the greatest opportunities you will ever have, I suppose, really to live
with, to mingle with, to share the lives, the sorrows, the disappointments, the hopes, and the
fears of ordinary people, at home and abroad.
This is one of the great blessings of youth, and I am so glad that in Vista and in the Peace Corps
and in other organizations, we have made good use of these opportunities that come usually to
youth. Though if you are an academic person, you can—even if you are fat and over 50—an
academic person is blessed. And this is one of the great blessings of teaching, you are blessed
with a kind of prolongation of youth. Because your life is simple; professors aren’t treated as
awesome, remote figures. They’re certainly not driven in chauffeured automobiles and told
where to go and told where not to go by security guards of the host government. We can, we

do lead rather simple lives; professors do, I think. And the greatest blessing that we have as
professors is, of course, our continued contact, association, in and out of the classroom with
the young people.
I am sure that the greatest single inducement toward an academic life in the United States is
that one. That a man, though the years come on him, is required to renovate his thought to
keep up or try to keep up, sometimes running in a rather panting way, intellectually at least,
behind the ever-better young people. And that of course is the second great and exciting thing
to me. A man from another walk of life said to me recently, a commissioner of one of our
services who is a hobbyist in a particular field, and I asked him why he was doing this. He said,
“I’ve given up entirely to the young people. They are so phenomenal,” he said. I said, “Really,
are they so much better than your generation was? Our generation was?” He said, “Yes, they
are, astoundingly so.” He said, “Covey, I don’t care what they say, people are getting better!
And it’s these young people that show that.” Now that, I feel and believe myself. And again, it’s
one of the great rewards of the life that I have away from Washington.
The opportunities in Washington perhaps will come up later on. But I want to go now to the
general theme that I am to talk about this afternoon. Being back in the Pacific area of the
United States, in a beautiful city and in a splendid academic environment, I am not unnaturally
reminded of an event that occurred to me some years ago when I was first on the University of
California faculty. I wasn’t there long until I discovered the delights of the western slope
tendency to together to talk about foreign affairs on weekends, and sometimes for longer than
weekends. Sometimes for weeks. Or least for a week at a time. And this was great for me at the
time, as I’m sure it must be to your President to be installed shortly, also, because when you
leave Washington, when you leave the neurotic, fingernail-chewing environment of
Washington, and come out into the great, big, fat, happy, well-adjusted western slope, at first
you are a little bit at a loss. You worry: why these people aren’t worrying more? Now, this may
not be true with your generation, I’m speaking of my experience with the western slope. And
the greatest adjustment assistance that I got to a new life was from this lovely western slope
habit of getting together to talk about foreign affairs.
On one occasion, I was invited to a meeting at Whittier College, California which now has a
particular claim to fame, as some of you may realize, to participate in a week-long session on
U.S. foreign policy in 1951. And there my assignment was to explain NATO. I am reminded of
this, too, because just yesterday NATO was talked about again, and is today in the press. Now
the American Friends Service Committee—bless their hearts—are regarded as somewhat
avant-garde, or at least they were by the more established sectors of the Society of Friends.
And I must tell you that I did not have the easiest assignment on the program; to talk about

NATO collective security and defense in a Quaker audience was a little bit less than what some,
at least, expected would be the subject. I remember very well that the heroine of one of the
general sessions was a very attractive red-headed gal from the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the UN, who said—and this was 1951, mind you—“All the problems that we
have in the world can easily be settled if we have a higher protein input into the world's food
supply, and the way to do that is to take plankton from the sea and make it into little cakes; and
everybody should eat more plankton, especially in the developing countries, and there will be
peace in the world.” She was wildly applauded.
When I had to make my talk about NATO and discuss infrastructure and this and that and the
other, the applause was more restrained, but my real problem came in my working session, the
sort of session we have after these general ones. Because there, I had in my participating group
a fellow who called himself “John the Believer.” John was the first hippie I ever saw, and that
was 1951, you see. So I haven't been surprised by developments since, because the precursors
of the present hippies were well-known to those of us who lived in California a number of years
ago now. John wore sandals, he wore a robe, he had a beard and a mustache, and he looked as
if he had just stepped out of a lithograph of one of the less tasteful Protestant versions of the
New Testament. You know what I mean. John, therefore, both repelled and awed me; he awed
me because he played upon my childhood conditioning to some extent, I suppose, and he
repelled me because I thought that he was a put-on, you see.
John kept interrupting me as I tried to lead discussion on NATO, because John, it turned out
was a monetary determinist. And these, when you run into them, are very, very insistent
people indeed. John said, “The trouble with the world is, the reason we don't have peace, is
because the ruble boiler and the dollar boiler or not at the same pressure. Now what we have
to do is build some financial tubing, put in some valves, and get their money system and our
money system at the same pressure, and then we'll have peace. I don't agree with this woman
who says you have peace by serving plankton from the sea, and I don't agree with you who say
we can have peace by creating a defensive detente in Europe to keep the Soviets from
sweeping west across the North European plain. No, it's the money problem.”
So John… John would get in my way and I would be very polite with him and try to get back to
my subject, but on one occasion he did it once too often. And I'm not a law professor for
nothing, though I'm sure our ways of teaching will change with time; there was a time when we
were, some of us were, rather specialist in what we called “chopping them off.” That is, getting
rid of the particular point of view in the insistent but off-the-beam critic. And I chopped off
John. The session ended shortly thereafter, and I found myself out under an avocado tree
surveying the scene, relaxing. And I looked up and there was John, looking at me:

beard, mustache, soft brown eyes, robe, sandals, scratching himself a little bit here as he
looked. There was silence and then John spoke.
And John said, “You are very fortunate man. People will listen to you. Just because you are a
professor. No one will listen to me unless I wear this god-damn bedsheet.” [laughs] And with
that I said, “John, old boy, let's go and talk it over.” So we went off and had a beer together,
[laughs] and he gave me his file, and I still have it. I have a file called, “Novel and Screwball
Proposals” and one in there is John the Believer’s notion of how to bring peace to the world by
adjusting the pressure between the ruble boiler and the dollar boiler. Now, I'm not telling you
this story just to be pleasant, though it was a vote by the return to the west and by the pleasant
memories I have of people getting together to talk about foreign affairs in the west. But of
course it has, to me at least, a deeper meaning.
Here we have put out, put before us, what I would regard as one of the major perils in U.S.
foreign affairs decision-making: the peril of premature determinism, or of insistence that a
particular or specialized course of action is the only solution, or is The Way, capital T capital W,
to the attainment or the achievement of peace. It is difficult to be eclectic. It is difficult to be
scientific and objective. It is very difficult to be responsible. And yet, these attributes are
required; foreign affairs is not a middle-aged version of a childhood game, or… it isn't even an
adult game. Foreign affairs is a part of human relations, and I would like to start right there with
Dr. Oliver’s deterministic prescription for this afternoon: violating my own principles slightly,
but only slightly, I hope.
I believe that it lies within the power of this generation of students to help greatly in the
restructuring of curriculum and subject matter in our universities. We who are teaching these
days are feeling beneficial effects of student interest in curriculum; I certainly am at the
University of Pennsylvania this year. And among the interests that I hope you will focus on,
those of you who have specialty concern along these lines, is that branch of the social sciences
known as international relations. In my view, international relations as a body of knowledge
requires a great deal of further development, especially in the field of bringing social
psychology more into the amalgam that we call the study of international relations.
It seems to me that we are still far too often studying international relations in a Bismarckian
atmosphere, an atmosphere of power politics oriented toward nineteenth-century European
notions. Notions that managed to squeeze out of almost every situation those human factors of
greatness and fallibility that the scholars in this field have never dealt with. It remained for
Barbara Tuchman, a non-academic but very great writer, to bring out, to begin to bring out, the
human factors involved in that great tragedy, World War I.

It seems to me that in our work in the universities in the field of international relations, we
simply must break away from this old-fashioned, power politics, balance of power orientation
in the field of foreign affairs. We must see nations and their leaders as people. As “poor
slobs,” as Li'l Abner would say, trying to do their best. And that usually is the case for a
particular country, I think, including this one. And not doing it as well as they might. And in part
not doing it as well as they might because the present generation of decision-makers is not well
trained yet as to the factors that lie beyond the historical repetition of what happened, at least
as a particular old-fashioned historian has seen that. We need a new science, and I mean
science! I'm not just using rhetoric here: a new science of human understanding, where the
nation state, and human beings, and international organizations, and the dim shape of things to
come that have not yet come to us in the way of organization of society, are brought together
in a more questing and a more inquiring way then they have been brought together before,
especially insofar as attitudes are concerned.
Some of what I'm saying to you now I have a stressed in a very modified or moderate—
moderate is the word I want to use—in a moderate way, in a piece in the April issue of Foreign
Affairs, called “Foreign and human relations with Latin America.” If any of you find this line of
thought of interest to you, I will extend my remarks, as they would say in the Congress, in the
record. But I don't know the answers; I don't know enough myself to make any meaningful
scientific appraisals of attitudes. I do know this—and I'm a modest man with a great deal to be
modest about—I know that in our relations with Latin America I am more sensitive, better
attuned to these factors, than almost any other Latin American I know. And that is a very
serious admission, for me, the former Assistant Secretary of State and U. S. Coordinator of the
Alliance for Progress, to say that. It means that I don't think we have the people now to do the
kinds of jobs that need to be done in this field.
Those few of us who do it, do it by instinct. By the accident of our early conditioning, or
training, or something in in our makeup that just happened. What we have got to do, ladies and
gentlemen, in this field, is to begin to make the people that we have got to have. Make them
formación, (training/trained) as we say in Spanish; make them by training them. And I think
we're doing a very slow process on this at the present time. The concept isn't even wellestablished yet. Far too many of our universities are turning out people to go to work for
government and foreign affairs, trained to be junior Machiavellis, or Castlereaghs third-class, or
Metternichs of the back stairs. Now, that just won't do. That's not the way it is, really, in the
conduct of international relations.
At any rate, this is one point I want to bring to your attention, and it's not something that one
can go off and talk quite easily about. One has to know a little bit about what one should be

talking about. In specific terms, what I'm talking about here is the great need for a great deal
more work in social psychology, oriented toward what are known as attitude studies, about
elite and other groups in societies, to the end that we understand the decision-making process
in foreign affairs better than we do at the present time. The time has come when foreign affairs
decisions cannot be made on the basis of power alone or on the basis of wealth alone; we all
know that. We see it in our experience. We see it in the sad, sad postponement of the hopes of
my generation for the United Nations; and I come on now to a second theme.
You, too, have to adapt a little from that old, square poem of R. Kipling’s, “If—.” You do; you
will have to “stoop and build again with worn-out tools.” Because many of the dreams that my
generation dreamed and hoped to see achieved in our time have not been achieved; not
because we are hypocrites, but simply because things didn't break that way. We tried, we tried:
but so much remains to be done. Don't assume that because it's in bad shape now it is beyond
salvage, however. Just let me illustrate what I mean very briefly.
We are all impatient. The younger we are, the more impatient we are; at least I think that is
true in my own case. I wasn't a college student or youth when the European economic… when
the European Union became a topic of great expectation in the late forties and early fifties. I
left the Department of State to go to Berkeley in ‘49. I'll tell you that when I left to go to
Berkeley, I expected western Europe to be politically as well as economically unified by 1955.
Instead, I found myself in Europe in 1955, while lecturing at The Hague Academy of
International Law, wondering what the foreign ministers of the 6 countries were going to
decide at Messina, Sicily, as to whether to go forward with European economic unification. And
now you know what's happened even to that; the common market is been thrown for a partial
loss from which I'm sure it will recover.
The United Nations has not lived up to the expectations we had of it. Perhaps its basic design
was faulty, in terms of the concept of the five permanent members with veto power; I certainly
think so. But what is the problem today? The problem today is not the veto in the Security
Council, but a completely unwieldy and irresponsible General Assembly. Now, we have to face
the question, you'll have to face the question, of what we do about many states as well as
superpowers, because one is just as serious a problem for the future as the other. But we can't
go back, at least that's my view; and here I will be deterministic. We can’t go back to the nation
state system as it existed at the time of the outbreak of World War II. This would be the most
dreadful regression that I could imagine.
We have got to go forward; we have got to go back and pick up and improve, improvise, maybe
scrap, for something better, not for something worse. If you're going to scrap an arrangement

because it isn't working, go forward; and let me be corny enough to refer to those gentleman
who met in Philadelphia in 1787 to do something rather extra-officially, as a matter of fact,
about the Articles of Confederation that simply weren't working for us here. Now what they
came out with was an awful lot better, as I'm sure we would all agree. And I want to come on to
that now as the theme for you while college students, university students, and young activists
in or out of school.
Take a look at separation of powers under our Constitution in relationship to foreign affairs
decision making in the world today. Think about it; but all I'm saying is think about it. Don't
assume that a venerable document that we all swear to protect, preserve, and defend in one
way or another is the last word for all time in governmental arrangements. Like Li'l Abner says
about the “I respects the U.S. mail,” I certainly respect the Constitution of the United
States. But I'm saying to you, that over many years of observation of U. S. foreign affairs, I've
come to the conclusion that the gravest crisis we face in the foreign affairs field is that of
divided decision-making between the executive and legislative branches under the present
arrangement. The present arrangement is not conducive to cooperation and collaboration.
When U.S. Senator Fulbright makes his novel proposal that the Senate—by which he means the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, I assume—should in some way have a voice in the
making of U.S. foreign policy on substantive matters as a result of an advice-and-consent
arrangement, which of course in the Constitution pertains to the advice and consent to treaties,
not to policy; they're different things. He overlooks the fact that G. Washington, as many of you
know, started that way but it didn't work. A major problem is that Congress as it is structured is
not competent to give continuous responsible attention to foreign affairs.
The Congress—I'm not talking about this or that committee, or this or that distinguished
senator, such as my dear and admired friend Senator Morse, who was here with you
yesterday—what I'm saying is something different. It’s “we or they”… it's “we and they”
instinctively under our present Constitution, because that's what Montesquieu meant it to
be. Montesquieu developed as an eighteenth-century… he and other eighteenth-century
thinkers were concerned with the problem of executive or monarchial tyranny. And they gave
us a system of divided powers designed in rather clever ways, almost mechanical ways, to
ensure against tyranny. And I must say that for us, they seem to have ensured reasonably well,
though the system as copied from us in Latin America has not worked the same way.
The constitutions of the Latin American countries are like ours, but in those countries the
weakness of the legislature and the elective system has resulted in the presidential powers,
strong to begin with in constitutions of this sort, being magnified to the detriment of the

failsafe principle known as separation of powers. What to do to change their ideas? I’m not
going to be determinist enough to give you mine. I am simply want to ask you, in the words of a
great justice who said in a dissenting opinion: if we would guide by the light of reason, we must
let our minds be bold. And I'm saying that on the question of how we manage decision-making
in our foreign affairs for future, in this country we ought to break out of conventional models
and think about the problem.
There are many possible ways of dealing with it; one would be of course the institutionalization
of some means of regular consultation between the executive and the legislative branches
under the present constitution. Another way would be to go now, in the maturity of our politics
if we regard ourselves as such, to a ministerial form of government. Though there, there are
problems too. Perhaps it may be that the solution will be found in a change of attitude: a
change of attitude as to what the sense of mission of the Congress is in this field. It's along
these lines, I think, that Senator Fulbright himself has been thinking.
It may be that the change in attitude would come from the concepts of foreign affairs
responsibility, that one of you, of your generation who becomes President of the United States,
might put forward. I mention this because I do believe that Woodrow Wilson was right and is
still right when he says that “The great Presidents of our country are those who catch the spirit
of the American people in their time. And having caught that spirit, go forward; and no
Congressman or group in Congress can then dare stand in the way. But ah… there's danger
there too. Suppose the spirit of the people should, by my standards at least, be a bad
spirit. Then I wouldn't want to see a President capture that spirit and go forward I know not
where.”
I mention that point simply because I do believe that we, though less than 200 years old, have
developed very rapidly as nations develop in history. Perhaps we have grown too rapidly too
soon. And I think there is a little bit of danger; a danger that some have seen as larger than I see
it, that we may become the new Romans too soon. There are many things in our society that
can be linked to Rome. The prosperity, the affluence, the janissaries rather than participating
citizens. All of those things, plus our superpower status, plus our confrontation with a clearly
Byzantine chief opponent for the minds of man: all of those things are worrisome to me. And
leadership in this country, the leadership that you will have very, very shortly—though of
course in the question period we may discuss why you don't get it sooner, I wish you could, as a
matter of fact, but that's not my topic for this presentation.
It will be you in our society who set the tone for our future leadership in both the Congress and
in the executive branches of the government, and regardless of what I've said about taking a

new look at the Constitution, simply because a new look should be taken at everything,
including the Constitution. Don't assume from that that I believe that fiddling with papers, with
documents, is going to give us answers. The answers come from the spirit in the minds of men
and women. And the spirits and minds of the men and women who will be running this country
very soon are here this afternoon. I'm pleased and encouraged that those of you who will be
running the country soon have been willing to devote a lovely Saturday afternoon to thinking
about that aspect of U. S. foreign policy that it falls to me to report. Good luck; we and the
future will shortly be in your hands. Thank you. [applause]
HOST: For a short period of time Dr. Oliver has consented to questioning, and all we ask is that
you stand and speak out quite loud, because we don't have mics on the floor. John.
[audience member asks question in background, inaudible]
OLIVER: The only protection against a special pleading, the only protections against special
pleaders are these. 1) Rejoinder. Detect a special pleader for what he is and say so. 2) Be sure
that you have called to attention the fact that a special interest involvement does exist. I have
had, just recently, considerable opportunity to reflect upon what I would call the non-nefarious
or non-self-serving special pleading. As a law professor and professor of international law, I
thought the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act was utter folly. Absolutely
foolish. [applause]
The people who put the Hickenlooper Amendment in were brother lawyers who were psychotic
almost about the question of nationalization without compensation in foreign countries. I felt
that they were misguided in this concern, because after all, any compensation—prompt
adequate and effective, we say in our notes to other countries—is a salvage operation. And
actually foreign capital going out to another country doesn't go out thinking timidly about
whether it's going to be able to get salvage out if it gets nationalized. The motivations of people
who go out to do business are somewhat different from that. At any rate, that's an example.
What I'm trying to get to is this point: that not all special interest activity is directly coupled to
some clearly conceived special advantage to be reaped by it; you follow me? A lot of it simply
comes from misguided attitudes. And if the latter is the case, then of course you have your
answer. Avoid misguided attitudes.
HOST: Any further questions? Yes, […].
[question in background, inaudible]

OLIVER: Very, very, very wise question. Did all of you hear it? Did everybody hear the question?
The question was this, “Assuming that the Latin Americans have some degree of rejection
reaction against us because we are ‘top dog,’ the question was, because we've been more
successful than they, are we going to have to go to multilateral forms of assistance,
development assistance to Latin America, in lieu of our utilization in part, today, our bilateral
relations with the particular countries?” The answer is that participation by the developing
countries themselves in the development process is absolutely key to its success. The
resentments that you referred to exist, though they are not in virulent form, I don't think.
But what is really needed more than anything else is more collaborative work between the
Latin American countries themselves. And you may not believe this, but I'll testify to it here or
under oath. In my view, the main motivation of the United States in expressing enthusiasm for
and being willing to support with money—this was the last administration; I trust that the new
one will agree to continue this—to support economic integration of Latin America. Now, there
are sound economic reasons for that. The Latin Americans can't realize the economies of scale
that come from industrialization unless they have a wider market to trade in than they have
now, obviously. But the United States, I am convinced, wants to see Latin America strong and
united, cohesive; just as we wanted to see western Europe united. We foresaw in ‘48 and ‘49
that a united western Europe would be a sort of third force; would have its own points of view
that we couldn't carry them with us on every issue. But the price was not too much to pay. The
United States, it seems to me, is—it has been for some years and still is—groping toward the
support of something new in the way of organization in this world. We would like to see more
aggregations of people, from 200 to 350,000,000 people, brought together in some sort of
association.
I don't think we have ever plumbed our souls, our Jungian American soul, as to why this is. I
think we do feel that way; now why? I ask myself. In part, I think it's because honest to God—
and I think you young people show this attitude—honest to God, we don't like being a
superpower. We are not comfortable in a superpower world; we like a world of more equal
power. And more equal power is not going to come in any way but to bring smaller states in the
present world community together in regional groupings that approximate in size and in
economic capacity the present larger aggregations in the world. I firmly believe that we believe
that, though we don't say to ourselves every day that we do. And I think it's a very great plus for
us that we do.
And therefore I am sure that what you say is in conformity with a very deep sense of foreign
policy desirability on the part of the United States. Of course, I could have given you a shorter
answer; I could have said, “Yes, that's what everybody says, that multilateral assistance is

better than bilateral assistance.” I can give you that answer too, but as to multilateral
assistance I want to say this. Multilateral assistance means independent decision-making by
apolitical international civil servants. If you're going to talk about multilateral assistance
dominated by the United States, then it isn’t really multilateral assistance, it's only unilateral
assistance of a more cumbersome sort; and the end result of that will be that we’ll wreck the
international system. Or it will have to get along without us, one or the other.
And I'm not just talking theoretically here. I know very well; I've had experience with
Congressional efforts to be specifically intrusive on the operations, the decisional operations of
international development agencies. It's the old theory, and I heard it when I was younger. I
went up once with a very great gentleman, a former under-Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, the honorable Will Clayton. And a congressman asked him why the United States had
tolerated a particular course of conduct by one of the western European allies. And Mr. Clayton
explained very courteously and calmly, “Well, you see, Mr. Congressman, they have certain
expectations. And they have suffered greatly from the Germans in World War II. We felt that if
they were not allowed this, it might have serious political repercussions in the country, and
beyond that, it might have a bad morale effect on the people.” This was before the Marshall
Plan. To which an insensitive congressman no longer in Congress replied, “Well, I always say, ‘If
they take our money when we say flog, they oughta hop.’” Now, that attitude cannot be
allowed to prevail in international assistance agencies simply because the United States
supplies the money. [applause]
HOST: Stand.
[question in background, inaudible]
OLIVER: Very well; did you all hear the question? The question was, “Is there, in effect, a fourth
branch of government, a bureaucratic branch, that in the field of foreign affairs really makes
policy or has a very important influence on it?” The questioner began by saying, “Maybe we
should have had representatives of that faceless bureaucracy, the fourth branch of the
government, here.” I won't volunteer to be the representative of that group now, though I have
had considerable familiarity with it, and could have joined it. The answer—and this is an honest
answer, really, by me—the honest answer is that there is not a decision-making group that is
not responsible to the political forces in this country.
The decision-makers who continue in service do not have a pervasive and continuous influence
on the major decision-making that goes on in our government. Now you may say “Of course
they do, because they control the flow of information.” Or intelligence, whatever you want to

call it. Now, intelligence is not just something that 007 digs up in a bedroom, you know; it can
be found in the financial section of the New York Times as well. They know the facts, and those
who know the facts are the ones who control the situation. My response to that, which is not
defensive, and I hope not offensive, is that we don't know a hell of a lot from these people, to
tell you the truth. One of the startling things to me about U. S. foreign affairs operations is that
we do have very little advance information on events.
I'll just tell you, as a fact though maybe it’s indiscreet to say so, in the last the last few months
of my tenure I was very fortunate on the whole. There were coups in Peru—a coup in Peru and
one in Panama, and a hemidemisemi-coup in Brazil—a sort of a realignment of power, shall we
say, very much, in Brazil's case, very much like the De Gaulle business in France in ’58; very,
very similar. As to those three I had not, as Assistant Secretary of State, one bit of prior
information that anything was going to happen. Nothing, absolutely nothing. So, you can't
assume, I'm answering that way, that there is such a great reservoir or flow of information that
the controllers of it control the decision-makers. Actually, the decisions, the ones that we call
foreign policy decisions, tend to boil down to simply stated very big issues.
And those issues are fairly well understood by anyone who reads the serious American
press. And those decisions are made, in the last analysis, by one man; the man that we all elect
the president of the United States. It might amaze you to know how much detailed decisionmaking in foreign affairs is made by a president. But I suppose I had better desist there. Our
presidential styles vary, but I've had experiences that indicate that fairly small matters are
actually decided by the President. Now under those circumstances, my view is that the fear of a
kind of palace guard or an establishment of ancient functionaries, as one writer says, explains
how government used to continue in France before De Gaulle. You know, the civil service kept
it going, even though the prime ministers had changed with considerable frequency. I just
don't think we have that sort of an establishment in the United States and I have been pretty
close to it, on several occasions, maybe too close. If anyone else wants to comment or debate,
I'll be very happy to participate. All I've done is giving you testimony.
HOST: Now I think what we will do is, is move back into groups. Dr. Oliver has willingly made his
time available to us this afternoon, and he's going to go around to the different groups, and if
there are any further questions, I think you could ask him at that time. So at this time, we will
move there and continue the discussion. Thank you. [applause]
OLIVER: Thank you for having me. Ah, look at this… uh-huh. […]
[side conversations continue off microphone; program ends]

